Alternative estimates of Japanese saving and comparisons with the U.S.: Can the capital gains to land be included in "saving?" by Dekle, Robert
Alternative Estimates of Japanese Saving 
and Comparisons with the U.S.: Can the Capital 
Gains to Land be Included in "Saving?" 
Robert Dekle 
Working Paper No. 52 
Professor Robert Dekle 
Center for International Relations 
Boston University 
This paper was written while the author was a visiting scholar at the Institute for Monetary and Economic 
Studies, the Bank of Japan. The author thanks the Bank staff, especially Mr. Shikano, Dr. Shibuya, and Ms. 
Nishizima for their extremely helpful advice. Lawrence Summers provided inspiration for Section 2 of this 
piece. Portions of Section 2 were included in the paper with Lawrence Summers entitled, "Japan's High 
Savings Rate Reaffirmed." I thank Professors Kazuo Ueda, Takatoshi Ito, Hajime Hori, Kenneth Singleton, 
Dr. Dale Henderson, attendees at a Stern School symposium, and seminar participants at Kyushu, Nagasaki, 
Osaka, Tokyo, Yokohama National Universities, the Bank of Japan, and the Japan Development Bank for 
helpful discussions. 
Working Paper Series  
Center on Japanese Economy and Business 




This paper presents several novel measures of Japanese 
saving and performs a U.S.-Japan comparison. We find that if 
"saving" includes the capital gains to land, the two country gap 
is much larger than what was conventionally believed. 
U.S.-Japan comparisons of saving based on the National 
Accounts have recently been sharply criticized by Hayashi 
(1986,1990). Briefly, Hayashi has argued that before comparisons 
are made, the definition of income, consumption, and government 
spending in the two countries must be made consistent. Hayashi 
carefully recalculates Japanese national saving according to the 
American Department of Commerce definition and finds that during 
the 1980s, Japanese national saving is nearly halved (Figure 1). 
The measures of Japanese saving examined in this paper are 
largely free from the National Income accounting biases that 
Hayashi is referring to. In fact, as discussed in the next 
section, our measures of saving tend to bias Japanese saving 
downward. If Japanese saving according to our definitions is 
found- to be higher than American saving, then the true gap is 
probably higher. Our measures of saving are constructed from the balance 
sheets of the household sectors in the United States and Japan. 
If there are no capital gains to reproducible capital and land, 
1Relative to the United States, Japanese consumption and 
government spending are underestimated. In the Japanese 
accounts, depreciation is treated at historical cost, and in 
times of high inflation*, the historical cost depreciation will 
tend to underestimate the true cost of capital consumption. In 
contrast to the U.S. accounts, government spending in the 
Japanese accounts does not include government investment. This 
difference in accounting convention will tend to raise American 
government spending relative to Japanese spending. 
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then our measures of saving will equal the National Accounts 
definition of income minus consumption. The U.S.-Japan saving 
gap becomes much wider according to our definition because of the 
large capital gains to land that Japan has experienced during the 
post-war period. Figure 2 shows that the capital gains to land 
has been especially pronounced since 1986. At the end of 1988, 
land comprised almost two-thirds of total Japanese national 
wealth. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section 
defines and constructs three alternative ways of looking at 
saving. Section 3 addresses the question of whether it is 
appropriate to include in "saving," the capital gains on land. 
If capital gains arise because of increases in lifetime income, 
then present and future consumption opportunities rise. Capital 
gains to land can also arise when the relative returns to land 
and capital change, with constant or declining lifetime income. 
In such instances, future consumption opportunities will not 
rise. It appears that a reasonable test of whether the capital 
gains on land can be included as saving is to examine whether 
consumption rises when there are capital gains. Section 4 
performs such a test using both aggregate time series data from 
March 1955 to September 1989 and a panel data set on Japanese 
prefectures covering the period 1970 to 1987. "We find that the 
rise in land prices appears to have affected Japanese 
consumption. The effect has been especially large between 1985 
and 1987, a period when the yearly increase in aggregate land 
values were over 1.5 times National Income. The tests performed 
in Section 4 also shed light on whether Japanese households on 
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average raise their consumption when housing values increase. 
Households can be divided into homeowners and renters. When 
housing prices increase, there is a transfer of wealth from 
renters to homeowners. Previous research has shown that Japanese 
renters on average decrease their consumption in response to an 
increase in land prices. If homeowners increase their 
consumption, the economywide net-effect is analytically 
ambiguous. The empirical results in Section 4 show that in the 
aggregate, the increased consumption of the homeowners is larger 
than the decreased consumption of renters. 
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2. Alternative Measures of Japanese Saving. 
2.1 The Harrod-Domar Condition. 
Table 1 depicts the ratio of net wealth to net disposable 
income for U.S. and Japanese households. Compared to American 
households, Japanese families hold a much larger percentage of 
their portfolios in land. In spite of the persistently high 
level of postwar saving, the ratio of non-land assets to DI in 
Japan still appears to be smaller in Japan than in the United 
States. 
It is well-known that the aggregate balance sheets of the 
Japanese household sector are not reliable. Equity and land 
appear to be substantially biased downwards (Ando, 1985; Hayashi, 
1986).3 Table 2 shows the levels of Japanese household non-
*Net wealth is the difference between gross wealth and 
household financial liabilities. Gross wealth includes 
inventories, non-reproducible assets such as land, the structure 
of the owner occupied home, and financial assets such as money, 
deposits, bonds, and equities. Disposable income is defined as 
household income minus the sum of direct taxes, interest payments 
on loans, social security payroll taxes, and various minor fines 
and fees. For Japan and the United States, the household sector 
includes private unincorporated non-financial enterprises and 
not-for-profit organizations. 
3In 1984, corporate equity held by the household sector was 
reported in the national accounts to be 15. percent of the market 
value of assets held by the corporate sector. A painstaking 
analysis by—Hoshi snd—Kays hap (1989 ) of 353 Japanese 
manufacturing firms listed on the Tokyo stock exchange has 
revealed that in 1984, Tobin's q was 1.10. The underestimate 
arises mainly because non-publicly traded stocks are valued in 
the national accounts at par, usually at 50 yen per share. 
For example, the par value of Bank of Japan stock is 100 
yen, and there are a million shares outstanding. On very rare 
instances, Bank of Japan equity is exchanged over-the-counter, 
and in January 1990, shares were traded at 680 thousand a share. 
Most unlisted corporations in Japan are very small. A firm 
can adopt the corporate form with 7 employees and 100,000 yen in 
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land assets, Non-land*, when the equity of unlisted firms is 
valued at market prices. The calculation procedure, described 
in the appendix, assumes that Tobin's g for unlisted firms is on 
average equal to that of listed firms. Since in practice 
Japanese firms with fewer employees have smaller q ratios, and 
since unlisted firms on average are smaller than listed firms, 
the wealth-disposable income ratios in Table 2 are an upper bound 
(Hoshi and Kayshap, 1989). The market valuation of unlisted 
firms raises Japanese non-land/disposable income ratios by over 
50 percent. 
The only item in the Japanese household balance sheets that 
is subject to an upward bias is the value of the structure of the 
owner-occupied home. As Hayashi (1986) points out, depreciation 
in the Japanese National Accounts is measured in terms of 
historical costs, while that in the U.S. is measured in terms of 
replacement costs, and in times of high inflation, this 
difference in accounting convention will tend to overstate the 
capitalization, and take advantage of limited liability and 
generous physical capital depreciation tax allowances. To be 
listed on a stock exchange, a firm's equity must be above a given 
amount, be widely traded, and the firm must run a profit two 
years in succession. In Japan at the end of March 1990, there 
were 975,861 corporations, and 4872 were listed on the two 
sections in Tokyo and the seven regional stock exchanges. 
Unfortunately without information on the market values of 
unlisted firms, it is difficult to accurately adjust upwards
 f the 
equity reported m the national accounts. In the text, a crude 
attempt is made to estimate the market value of unlisted firms 
by assuming that the q ratio of unlisted firms is equal to that 
of listed firms. 
The Economic Planning Agency imputes the value of land held 
by the household sector using the National Land Agency's "Posted 
Land Values" (Koii-Chika^ . It is estimated that in recent years, 
the Koii-Chika is about 70 percent of the market value of land. 
Since there are no official compilations of the actual 
transactions prices of real estate, it is not possible to develop 
a series for the market value of Japanese land. 
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value of Japanese depreciable assets. In 1987, depreciable 
assets were less than ten percent of household net assets. The 
footnote below shows that the historical cost depreciation of 
housing structures will at most upward bias the Japanese 
housing stock by about 3 percentage points of disposable 
income. Relative to the 19'87 household wealth-income ratio of 
almost 800 percent, the bias appears insignificant. 
According to the Harrod-Domar identity, the steady-state 
saving rate, s, is equal to g*W/Y, where g is the growth rate of 
real income and "W/Y is the wealth-income ratio.5 Table 3 shows 
the equilibrium saving rates for the two countries for various 
combinations of g and W/Y. Since the Japanese economy was 
probably not in the steady-state in the 1950s and 1960s, s is 
also calculated for the period starting in the mid-1970s. 
Let the annual rate of depreciation at replacement and at 
historical cost be denoted by d and d' . Assume that the gap 
between d and d' is constant over time. The two depreciation 
practices give two different values for the net capital stock at 
time t, K(t) and K'(t). As a fraction of disposable income, the 
difference in the two measures is, 
(K(t)-K'(t))/DI(1987)= (t-i)(d'-d)K(0)/DI(1987) 
+ (d'-d)I(t-2)/DI(1987) + higher order terms/DI(1987), 
where 0 is the initial time period. When time 0 is 1955, time 
t-1 will be 21 (= 1987-1955-1). Since d and d' are small, we 
can neglect the higher order terms. 
For residential housing, K(1955)/DI(1987) and 1(1985)/DI( 19 
87) are .025 and .03. Suppose there is a gap of 5 percent 
between d and d' for housing (approximately f.hp avpragfi—q^P-
between 1970 and 1985 as reported in Hayashi, 1986, Table 2). 
Substituting these values in the above formula, we get 0.028. 
Depreciation by historical cost will upward bias the measurement 
of the 1987 net housing stock by about 3 percentage points of DI. 
In the steady-state, the wealth-income ratio is constant. 
If income grows at g, saving or the change in wealth must equal 
g*W. The saving rate that keeps the wealth-income ratio constant 
is g*W/Y. 
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When wealth is restricted to non-real estate, the derived 
saving rates appear similar. The U.S.-Japan gap in saving rates 
when Non-land* is used is higher, but the gap is less than four 
percent. When wealth includes land, the Japanese derived saving 
rates rise to over twice the American rates. 
2.2 First Differences in Wealth 
Table 4 depicts the ratio of the annual changes in 
wealth to disposable income. Because the volatility in year-
to-year asset prices makes international comparisons difficult, 
period averages are depicted at the bottom of the, table. 
For the entire 1956 to 1987 period, the changes in non-
land wealth on average for the two countries appear roughly 
similar. Averages over sub-periods show that the Japanese first-
differences have been rising since the mid-1960s, while that for 
the United States have been falling. The gap has especially 
widened in the 1980s. 
"If we assume that Tobiri's q is 'equal to" one, there is no "" ^ 
government sector, and the economy is closed, then there is a 
straitforward relationship between the change in household non-
land assets and the conventional definition of saving of income 
6(W(t+l)-W(t))/DI(t). The taking of first-differences may 
not eliminate the downward bias in measured Japanese household 
asset values if there is an upward trend in the gap between the 
koii-Chika and the market value of land. For example, the gap 
between the Koii-Chika and the actual market values of land has 
apparently widened after the post-1986 surge in land prices. 
Since local governments use the Koii-Chika as the base for 
calculating property taxes, a rapid increase in the Koii-Chika 
may be politically infeasible, because the tax burden would 
automatically be raised. 
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minus consumption. 
The change in household non-land assets is equal to, 
k(t+l)*K(t+l)-k(t)*K(t)-d*k(t+l)*K(t+l) + p(t+l)L(c) - p(t)L(c) 
(1), 
where k(t) is the price of capital goods relative to consumption 
goods, K(t) is the capital stock, d is the annual rate of capital 
depreciation, p(t) is the price of land, and L(c) is the land 
held by the corporate sector. Note that when k(t) = k(t+l) and 
p(t) = p(t+l), the change in wealth will equal income minus 
consumption. During the 1980s, revaluations or the capital gains 
in corporate land holdings have been on average much larger in 
Japan than in the United States, which may help explain part of 
the rising gap in the first-differences of household non-real 
estate wealth between the two countries. 
- The introduction of the government sector complicates the 
comparison between the two measures of saving. In a closed neo-
Ricardian economy, net national saving will equal the change in 
household non-land wealth without asset revaluations, but the 
world may not be neo-Ricardian. 
The inclusion of land greatly increases the U.S.-Japan gap 
in the first-differences of wealth. The average Japanese changes 
in wealth over the period 1956 to 1987 and 1986 to 1987 are now 
over three times and nine times that in the United States. 
At the end of 1987, the corporate sector held over 28 
percent of the land in Japan. 
During the 1980s, there has been a fall in the relative 
price of capital goods in Japan. 
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2.3 The Absorbtion Approach 
The current account surplus is the excess of saving over 
domestic investment. If both the current account surplus and 
domestic investment are high, then saving must be high. Saving 
here is the conventional National Accounts definition of income 
minus consumption. The capital gains on land does not directly 
affect the current account. 
Figures 3 (a) and (b) depict the trends in the current 
account surpluses in the United States and Japan. The experience 
of the two countries are markedly different since the early 
1980s, with Japan running high surpluses, and the United States, 
large deficits. 
Tables 5 (a), (b), and (c) depict various investment-output 
measures.11 All three definitions show the Japanese investment-
output ratios higher than America's. In both countries, the 
9In the National Accounts, national saving differs from the 
sum of the current account surplus and domestic investment by the 
statistical discrepancy. For example, in 1981, the statistical 
discrepancy was 0.513 trillion yen. National saving in that year 
was 46.012 trillion.^ '_ ' .-.-_. 
10Real estate capital gains may indirectly affect the 
current account through its effect on consumption. Section 3 
discusses at length, the relationship between capital gains and 
consumption. 
uThe "nominal-nominal" ratios can differ from the "real-
real" ratios when the deflator for investment goods changes at 
at a rate different from the GNP deflator. Through most of the 
—197 0s and 19 80s, there nas Been a fall in the relative price of 
investment goods, which would tend to raise the "real-real" 
ratios without any change in the "nominal-nominal" ratios. 
In the OECD Accounts, asset specific depreciation rates do 
not exist, and only total investment rates are given. 
12In the Japanese national accounts, government investment 
and consumption are separated. In the American accounts, 
government investment is treated as consumption, and this 
practice would tend to understate total U.S. investment. 
Fortunately, the OECD National Accounts separate government 
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"real-real" investment ratios are higher than the "nominal-
nominal" ratios, suggesting that there has been a decline in the 
price of capital goods relative to the general price level. The 
U.S.-Japan gap cannot be explained by differences in depreciation 
accounting. When Japanese depreciation is valued at replacement 
costs, the investment-output ratio in Japan drops, but the ratio 
is still on average three times that in the United States. 
2.4 Summary 
It appears that during most of the post-war period, Japanese 
saving has been higher than U.S. saving. The result holds for 
when saving is restricted to the accumulation of non-land assets. 
A much larger gap, however, arises when land is included in the 
measure of wealth. The next section presents some conditions 
under which it may be appropriate to regard the capital gains on 
land as saving. 
consumption from investment for all countries. It appears that 
what is reported as government investment for the United States 
is the sum of non-military durable purchases by the Federal, 
State, and Local governments. 
13For 1970 to 1984, the excess of depreciation at 
replacement costs over depreciation at historical costs was taken 
from Hayashi (1986) Table A2. From 1985, the authors' 
calculation, using the method of Hayashi. 
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3. Can Capital Gains on Land be Considered "Savincr"? 
In this section, we present simple examples of real estate 
capital gains. We show that whether capital gains can be treated 
as saving depends on whether the gains are positively correlated 
with increases in lifetime income. 
In a world without uncertainty, households save either to 
raise their own future consumption or the consumption of their 
children. A rise in future consumption is therefore a type of 
saving. More formally, assume a two-period economy with perfect 
capital markets, and endowed with Kx capital, T land, and an unit 
of first-period labor earning w. The rates of return on capital 
and land in the two periods are r:, r2, and Rlf and R2«.' 
The budget constraint for this economy is, 
and the price of land at the end of the first period will be, 
Capital gains on land occurs when R2 rises by more than r2. 
For simplicity, assume a logarithmic utility function, 
where rho is 
the pure rate of time preference. 
Maximizing (3) with respect to (2), we get, 
Logarithmic utility is convenient because the marginal 
rate of substitution between first and second period consumption 
is independent of the real rate of interest. 
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Consumption in both periods are linear in lifetime income. 
From 4(b), we see that c2 can rise only when lifetime income 
rises. The objective of the following examples is to see when 
a rise in P is consistent with an increase in c2. "We define 
"saving" as an increase in period two consumption. There are 
cases in which c2 rises, while saving according to the National 
Accounts definition, Y: - clf falls. 
Example 1: Positive shock to the productivity of land. 
Assume that second-period output in this economy is produced 
by a Constant Elasticity of Substitution CES production function, 
where p is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and land. 
Cost-minimization entails a Rent-rental ratio of, 
Suppose consumers during period one expect in period two, 
land-augmenting technical progress, increasing a. An example 
of such technical progress in Tokyo would be a restructuring to 
produce higher value-added products. Factories producing goods 
that are in the mature phase of their product cycle would be 
converted to rerail outlets or office buildings housing financial 
firms. 
As long as the elasticity of substitution is greater than 
The literature on the endogenous bias of technical change 
suggests that firms will direct innovative activity to the most 
slowly growing factors (Phelps and Drandakis, 1966). 
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one, a rise in a will increase the rent-rental ratio. With a 
high elasticity of substitution, the quantity of capital does not 
have to be raised to increase output. The returns to capital can 
remain low, and most of the rise in output can be captured as 
land rents. 
With an utility function as in (3), both first and second 
period consumption rise with an increase in lifetime income. 
With Y2 remaining constant, first period income minus consumption 
will fall. 
Example 2: Negative shock to the productivity of capital. 
With an elastic CES production function, a negative shock 
to the productivity of capital will lower the rental rate 
relative to land rents* The price of land will rise, but there 
will be a decline in lifetime income. Second period consumption 
will fall. 
It would be difficult to attribute the recent rise in land 
prices to an expectation of future negative productivity shocks 
to capital. From 19.8.£...to 1988, the return on capital appears to 
have risen. Corporate profits increased at an annual average 
rate of 7.2 percent, compared to a 3.4 percent average for 1984 
and 1985. The Nikkei price index of stocks increased by 41 
percent between 1986 and 19 87, and 16 percent between 19 87 and 
1988. Negative productivity shocks, however, may have played a 
role in the run-up of real estate prices after the oil shock of 
1979. 
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Example 3: Changes in fiscal and monetary policies. 
Fiscal and monetary policies may affect the second period 
production function, possibly resulting in changes in asset 
prices. For example, the imposition of a first-period 
consumption or labor income tax may reduce the likelihood of a 
second-period hike in the tax on the pure land rent. Although 
there may be no change in the lifetime income of households, land 
prices will rise. 
As depicted in Figures 4(a) and 4(b), in Japan, growth in 
the supply of money has had a high degree of correlation with 
increases in land prices (Nishimura, 1990). A simple way to 
introduce money in the above model is to add government spending, 
G and subtract money, M from the right-hand side of, '(2). The 
government is assumed to raise revenue of M through seniorage and 
spend it lump sum as G. 
Include M in the production function (5) in place of the 
productivity shock, a. A rise in M will have a similar effect 
as a positive productivity shock to land. The inclusion of money 
in the production function "can be justified by appealing to the 
model of Kayshap, Sharfstein, and Weil (1990). A rise in land 
prices raises collateral, and the ability of firms to borrow. 
Money supply accomodates the demand for liquidity. Companies 
invest, increase their physical capital, future output and rents 
rise. 
A different model would add an asset demand function, 
Mi = L(R2ir2). 
A rise in Mx will change equilibrium R2 and r2, and it is 
possible for p to increase. Assume that lifetime income is held 
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constant. A fall in the price of second period consumption, r2, 
will raise first period consumption and decrease the level of 
second period consumption. A rise in the supply of money may 
raise land prices, but the effect of a rise in money supply on 
second period consumption depends on the model. 
The above examples show that whether capital gains can be 
treated as saving depends on the type of shock. Both positive 
and negative shocks can raise land prices, but lifetime income 
and future consumption opportunities rise only with the 
former. 
During much of the post-war period, the Japanese economy 
was in a transition phase from a low capital-output ratio.16 
The two-period model may fail to capture the relationship between 
land prices and the level of consumption when the economy is off 
the steady-state. A simple application of the Ramsey saving 
model suggests that the relationship between land prices and 
consumption again depends on the mechanism causing land prices 
to be high. If land prices are high because the pure rate of 
time preference is low, then the level of consumption during the 
transition phase will tend to be high. If, however, land prices 
are high because the economy is endowed with little land, then 
consumption during the transition phase will tend to be low. 
Assume a closed Ramsey-type infinite horizon economy, with 
production in every period characterized by a CES function 
separable in capital and .land as in (5) above. For simplicity, 
In 1955, the Japanese net reproducible capital-NNP ratio 
was 2.1. By 1988, the ratio was close to 3.0. 
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also assume that technical change, population growth, and the 
rate of capital depreciation are zero. In the steady-state, 
rho= K*~p and R*=(aT)"p, 
where rho is the pure rate of time preference of households. 
When households are "patient," rho will be low and steady-state 
capital, output, and land prices will be high. Given two 
economies with the same population, technology and intial 
endowments of capital and land, the economy with more "patient" 
households will have a faster accumulation of capital. In the 
steady-state, and during at least a portion of the transition 
path, the "low rho" economy will have a higher level of 
consumption and land prices. 
Now assume two economies that are identical except that one 
economy is endowed with less land. A fall in T raises steady-
state rents. Steady-state capital remains constant, but output 
and steady-state consumption will fall. An economy with little 
land will have rapidly rising land prices during the transition 
phase, but consumption will not rise as fast as an economy with 
more land. 
3•1 Summary. 
This section has shown that whether increases in today's 
land prices can be treated as "saving" depends crucially on 
whether tomorrow's consumption will rise. If land prices are 
17Since in the steady-state, the "low rho" economy will have 
a higher level of consumption than a "high rho" economy, with the 
same initial conditions, the "low rho" economy must have a higher 
level of consumption during at least a portion of the transition 
path in order for the "low rho" economy to overtake the "high 
rho" economy. 
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rising because of anticipated future productivity improvements, 
then future output and consumption will rise. Land prices can 
also increase without corresponding increases in future output. 
Monetary policies, for example, may in the short-run increase the 
returns to land relative to capital, raising land prices. 
The next section examines the correlation between land 
prices and household consumption using both time-series data and 
panel data for Japanese prefectures. The results help shed light 
on whether Japanese households view rising land prices as 
increases in lifetime income. 
18 
4. The Correlation between Land Prices and Consumption. 
According to the lifetime-permanent income hypothesis, the 
consumption of the household sector in each period t equals 
permanent income, the flow of rental income from total wealth, 
W(t), accruing at a risk-free, constant, interest rate of r, 
Household wealth is composed of land, the market value of 
eguities, financial assets, and the present discounted value of 
the returns to human capital, human wealth, 
W(t) = p(t)L(t) + Eguities(t) + Fin. Assets (t) + Human 
Wealth(t). 
"We estimate (6) for Japan using both time-series National 
Accounts data and prefectural level panel data from the Economic 
Planning Agency's Annual Report on the Prefectural Accounts. 
Appendix 2 describes both data in detail. 
4.1' Time-series Estimates, — 
Table 6 depicts the ordinary least squares estimates of the 
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"first-differenced" version of equation (6). As dependent 
variables, total household consumption and food consumption are 
used. Given the absence of a bi-annual series on household 
financial assets, the level of interest income is used as a proxy 
for financial assets. If interest rates are constant, the change 
18 
Even when the errors in the levels version of (6) is 
distributed as i.i.d., first-differencing will result in MA(1) 
errors. Equation (6) was also estimated by maximum-likelihood, 
taking account of the MA(1) error structure, and the results were 
not affected. 
19 
in financial assets will equal the change in interest income. 
To account for the seasonal patterns in consumption and labor 
income, a dummy variable that adopts a value of one during the 
September to March period is included in all specifications. 
In the aggregate economy, the changes in financial assets 
and equities are endogenous, and in columns (1) and (3) , 
financial assets and equities are dropped. From columns (1) 
and (3), we can observe that the change in land prices is 
significant at the 20 percent level. During the 36-year period 
between 1953 and 1989, land prices appear to be positively 
related to consumption. 
The t-statistics fall when stock prices and interest income 
are included. As shown in Figure 4(a), the movement*of equity 
prices closely parallels the movement in land prices, and it may 
be difficult to detect an independent effect of land prices on 
consumption. 
Figures 4(a) and (b) suggest that the change in land prices 
is likely to be correlated with the change in the real money 
supply. A regression of the change in land prices on the change 
in real money supply results in significant coefficients (Table 
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7, 1). If we assume that money is supplied exogenously, then 
the change in money supply can be used as an instrument for the 
change in land prices. Money appears to be significant (Table 
The change in the sum of financial assets and equities is 
endogenous, equal to the difference between income and 
consumption. 
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The change in real consumption is included to control for 
changes in permanent income. The correlation between money and 
land prices could be spurious if positive shocks to permanent 
income increase both land prices and money supply. 
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7, 2), although the possibility of endogenous money means that 
we should not place too much emphasis on the results.21 
Table (8) depict estimates using a test in Hall (1978) which 
provides further evidence for the correlation between land prices 
and consumption. If consumption responds to lifetime income with 
a lag and if lagged land prices affect the change in consumption, 
then lagged land prices must include information about lifetime 
income. The results in the Table suggest that lagged land prices 
does include information about lifetime income.22 The null 
hypothesis that all three coefficients of lagged land prices are 
jointly zero was rejected by the Likelihood-ratio test at the 
five percent level. 
4.2 Panel Data Estimates. 
As shown in Figure 2, there were three distinct episodes of 
above average annual increases in land prices between 1970 and 
1987: 1971-1973, 1978-1981, and 1985-1987. The shocks producing 
these changes in land prices are likely to be different for each 
of " the ""three "episodes.2 The inter-pref ectural land price 
If the Bank of Japan adjusts its monetary policy in 
response to economic fluctuations, the error term will be 
correlated with money and the estimates will be inconsistent. 
If lagged land prices were found to be insignificant, we 
still cannot reject the hypothesis that land prices affect 
consumption. Consumption may be responding to land prices 
without a lag. The significance of land prices allows us to 
reject the hypothesis that land prices do not affect consumption. 
The time path of consumption should not be affected by past land 
prices if land prices did not inform consumers about future 
trends in lifetime income. 
For a nice description of the possible shocks raising land 
prices during each of the three episodes, see Takagi (1989). 
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changes depict markedly different patterns. Figures 5(a) to (c) 
show that real land prices increased evenly throughout Japan 
between 1971 and 1973, but uniformly fell in 1973. In the second 
episode during and after the second oil crisis in 1979, real land 
prices increased across the country but did not fall (figures 
5(d)-(f)). The third episode constrasts sharply with the first 
two. Land price increases were initially concentrated in the 
Kanto region and gradually spread to other areas (figures 5(g)-
(h)). As of Fall 1990, statistics do not show a decline in the 
value of real estate. 
It is likely that estimates such as those depicted in Table 
6 give misleading results when they are based on a time period 
that has experienced several very different types of shocks. In 
this sub-section, we estimate equation 6 using prefectural level 
data for the above three sub-periods when land price volatility 
was abnormally high. "We find that during the first and third 
episodes, the change in land prices appear to be significantly 
positively related to the change in consumption. 
Table 9 shows the results" of the "fixed-effects' estimation 
of equation (6) using - a panel of 39 prefectures. Since 
household financial wealth holdings by prefecture cannot be 
observed, we assume that financial wealth is constant over the 
sub-period and include it in the unobserved fixed-effect. To 
correct for heteroskedasticity, all observations were weighted 
by the prefectural population, but the results were not 
significantly affected, and are not depicted in the table. 
2AA complete series spanning 1971-1987 could not be obtained 
for 8 prefectures, Hokkaido, Iwate, Fukushima, Nagano, Hiroshima, 
Tokushima, Kagoshima, Okinawa. 
22 
Land prices are found to affect consumption for the first 
and third sub-periods, but not for the second. As modelled in 
Section 3, if the rise in land prices during the second sub-
period is because of a rise in the price of oil, which is a 
negative shock to the capital shock, consumption should not be 
affected, or should even fall; lifetime income has declined. 
The "wealth-effect" of a change in land prices was 
especially high between 1985 and 1987. Between the end of 1985 
and the end of 1987, the value of land in Japan held by 
households increased by 417 trillion yen. The predicted change 
in household consumption is 14.18 trillion (=417 trillion * 
0.034), which is almost as large as the actual 14.50 trillion yen 
increase in household final consumption between 1985'and 1986. 
The value of the coefficient on the value of land, 0.034, appears 
close to the value of the real interest rate, which is what is 
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predicted by the lifetime income hypothesis. 
These results should be viewed with caution. The 
coefficient on labor income is also high at 1.31. There may be 




An individual has only two reasons to save, to increase his 
own future consumption, and to increase the consumption of his 
children. If the capital gains to some asset results in an 
increase in an individual's future consumption opportunities, 
then "saving" has taken place. 
This paper has argued that the gap in U.S-Japan saving rates 
is large if the capital gains to land can be included as saving. 
Including the gains to land, in the 1956-1987 period, Japanese 
households would have saved 38 percent of their disposable 
income, compared to 13 percent for American households. 
A crucial test of whether it is appropriate to include the 
capital gains to land as saving is to .see how* ' household 
consumption responds to changes in land prices. If the lifetime 
wealth-permanent income hypothesis holds, then consumption 
responds to changes in lifetime wealth. If consumption responds 
to changes in land, then it is probable that households regard 
the change in land prices as changes in future consumption 
opportunities and saving.- - " "~ ~ -.-... 
This paper has shown that at least for the early 1970s and 
the 1985-1987 period, Japanese households appear to view a change 
in land prices as an increase in their lifetime income and future 
consumption opportunities. The response of consumption to land 
prices is especially large in the 1985-1987 period; estimates 
appear to show that the entire 14.18 trillion yen change in 
family consumption during the two year period can be explained 
by the rise in the price of real estate owned by households. 
Appendix 1: The Construction of Table 2. 
a) Column 1. Tobin's q for Listed Corporations. 
The values for average q are from Hoshi and Kayshap (1989) 
Figure 3.5. The q values are for the median firm. For 
consistency with the definition of q in column (2), the value of 
q that is not adjusted for taxes is used. Included in the 
replacement cost of assets are depreciable assets, land, and 
inventories. 
b) Column 2z Tobin's q from the National Accounts. 
The figures are derived from dividing the value of equity 
held by the household sector by the net wealth (shomi-shisan) of 
the non-financial and financial sectors. 
c) Column 3: The Ratio of the Market Value of Corporate Equity 
held by households as reported in the National Accounts. 
Column (1) divided by column (2) equals the ratio of the 
market value of equity to the value of equity as reported in the 
National Accounts. The replacement costs of capital cancel out. 
The above calculation assumes that q is the same for listed 
firms as that for the unlisted. If unlisted firms have smaller 
q values, then the calculated economy-wide q will be biased 
upwards. The bias will be higher the larger the discrepancy 
between the qs of the listed and the unlisted firms and the 
larger the capital stock of the unlisted firms. 
The possibility of arbitrage by the buying and selling of 
unlisted firms suggest that the q of unlisted firms will on 
average not diverge far from the q of the listed firms. 
d) The Ratio of Non-land Assets to Household disposable income 
when equity is adjusted upwards to reflect market values. 
The value of equity as reported in the National Accounts is 
multiplied by column (3). To this figure, other household non-
land assets are added. 
Appendix 2: Description of the Data. 
A.2.1: Data used in the Time-series estimates. 
Since the mid-1950s, the Japan Real Estate Institute has 
published its index of land prices for all urban districts. The 
index is announced once every 6 months, at the end of March and at 
the end of September. The difference between two successive 
indexes would be the rise in land prices in the previous six 
months. 
Household total consumption, food consumption, the consumption 
deflators, and labor and interest income are available quarterly 
from the Japanese national accounts. To make the frequency of 
these variables correspond to the frequency of the land prices, we 
added the fourth and first quarters (October-March) and the second 
and third quarters (April-September) to get two observations per 
year. 
The Money Supply stock (M2+CD) and the Nikkei stock price 
index are available at monthly intervals from the Bank of Japan 
data files. We took the observations for the end of March and the 
end of September for both stock variables. It has been pointed out 
that we should have used the broader TOPIX index for stock prices, 
but the results were not affected by the choice of the stock market 
index. 
With 3 3 years and one 6 month period, we have 67 observations. 
A.2.2 Data Used in the Panel Estimates. 
Prefectural consumption, the labor income of prefectural 
residents, prefectural population, the prefectural expenditure 
deflator, and the dividend receipts of prefectural residents are 
available by prefecture from the Annual Report on Prefectural 
Accounts. The 1970-1975 data are from the 1980 edition; the later 
years are from the 1990 edition. Unlike the 1976-1987 data, the 
1970-1975 data are not based on the new SNA statistics. We assume 
that the yearly dummies will correct for the definitional 
differences. 
The stock of equity wealth by prefecture is derived as 
follows. Aggregate equity wealth held by the household sector at 
the end of each year is available from the balance sheets section 
of the Japanese national accounts. We assume that the distribution 
of aggregate equity wealth among prefectures is proportional to the 
interprefectural distribution of dividends. 
The value of prefectural land held by households is from the 
Japanese national accounts. For all stock (land and equity) 
variables, the end-of-the-year values are used. 
A3ri—variables—are—divided—by—the—prefectural—expenditure 
deflator for the given year to arrive at the real values. 
Figure 1 
Percent of Net National Product 
Figure 2 
Wealth-NNP Ratios by Year 
Table 1 
Net Wealth-Net Disposable Income (DI) Ratios 
for U.S. and Japanese Households 
Table 2 
The Ratio of Japanese Household Non-land Wealth to Disposable Income When 
the Equity of Unlisted Corporations is Valued at Market Prices. 
Note: See Appendix 1 for details in the construction of the four columns. 
Post-1984 data on Tobin's Q for listed firms is not available in Hoshi and 
Kayshap (1989). Column (3) is the ratio of the market value of corporate 
equity to the equity as reported in the national accounts. Non-land* is 
the value of household non-land assets when the equity of unlisted 
corporations is valued at market prices. 
Table 3 
U.S. and Japanese Saving Rates Derived from the Harrod-Domar Condition 
s= "W/Y*g 
v
 • . Table 4 
Annual Changes (First-Differences) in the Wealth-Disposable Income 
Ratios for U.S. and Japanese Households 
Figure 3(a) 
America's Current Account/GNP 
Figure 3(b) 
Japan's Current Account/GNP 
Tableau) 
Japanese and American Gross Investment Rates 
Table 5(b) 
Japanese and American Gross Investment Rates 
Table 5(c) 
Japanese and American Net Investment Rates 
(Net Nominal Investment/NNP) 
Table 6 
Effect of Land Prices on Aggregate Consumption 
Figure 4(a) 
Growth in Real Money Supply and Asset 
Prices (1956-1989) 
Figure 4(b) 
Money Supply Changes and Land Price Changes 
Table 7 
The Correlation of Real Money Supply with Land Prices and the 
Money Supply as an Instrument in the Consumption Function. 
(Money Supply: M2+CD) 
1) Change in Land Prices= Constant + Change in Real Consumption 
1.92 0.0125 
(1.65) (2.38) 




2) Change in Real Consumption= Constant + Chance in' Real Money 
-1124.4 0.105 
(-7.56) (3.99) 




Note: T-statistics are in parentheses. Observations, 67, March 
1953-September 1989. 
Table 8 
Do Lagged Land Prices Affect The Change in Consumption. A Hall 
(1978)-type Test. 
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Figure 5 ( a ) 
Percentage Change in Real Land Prices 
1971-1972 
Figure 5(b) 
Percentage Change in Real Land Prices 
1972-1973 
Figure 5 (c ) 
Percentage Change in Real Land Prices 
1973-1974 
Figure 5(d) 
Percentage Change in Real Land Prices 
1978-1979 
0.3 , 
Figure 5 (e ) 
Percentage Change in Real Land Prices 
1979-1980 
Figure 5(f) 
Percentage Change in Real Land Prices 
1980-1981 
Figiure- 5(g) 
Percentage Change in Real Land Prices 
1985-1986 
Figure 5(h^ 
Percentage Change in Real Land Prices 
1986-1987 
Table 9 
Fixed-effects Estimates of the Effect of Prefectural Land Prices 
on Prefectural Aggregate Consumption 
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